Contract—Certainty in Contract—Subsequent Parol Agreement Not Binding—When by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 7 Issue 2 
January 1922 
Contract—Certainty in Contract—Subsequent Parol Agreement 
Not Binding—When 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Contract—Certainty in Contract—Subsequent Parol Agreement Not Binding—When, 7 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 137 
(1922). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol7/iss2/7 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
REVIEW OF RECENT DECISIONS
ACCIDENT INSURANCE_-DEATH RESULTING FROM INSURED
VOLUNTARY ACT-MEANS MUST BE ACCIDENTAL.
In Ramsey v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 223 S. W. 841, (Tenn.) 13 A. L
R. 651 (note p6 660), recvery was sought on a policy of accident insurance
and the caim, based on the death due to blood poisoning following the extrac-
tion of a tooth. The court denied recovery, declaring that the bill of plaintiff
did not allege the means causing the injury were accidental nor that the tooth
was pulled accidently nor that the accident happened while the tooth was being
pulled. According to the weight of authority it is held that death or injury
does not result from accident or accidental means within the tam of an acci-
dent policy where it is the natural result of the insured's voluntary act, unac-
companied by anything unforseen, exce$ the death or injury. Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Spftz, 246 Fed. 817; Young v. Railway Mail Assn. 126 Mo.
App. 325, 103 S. W. S; Pickett v. Pacific Mut. L Ins. Co, 144 Pa. 79. It
is not shown in the Tennessee case that the means by which the gums were
injured, were intentionally and purposely applied, but on the other hand it
appears that the insured knew that the inevitable result of the pulling of the
tooth would be to break down and lacerate the gum tissue. The means
not being accidental nor the result following the pulling of the tooth and lac-
eration of the gum tissue expected or forseen there can be no recovery on the
policy. 224 N. Y. 18, 120, N. E. 56.
CONTRACT--CERTAINTY IN CONTRACT-SUBSEQUENT PAROL
AGREEMENT NOT BINDING-WHEN.
The ease of Fuller v. Presnell, 233 S. W., 502, was an action for damages
for breach of contract for sale of lumber. The plaintiff obtained judgment
for $1,710, and the defenda.t appealed. The contract is evidenced by the fol-
lowing writing signed by the defendant: "Received of Oscar Fuller two hundred
fifty dollars ($250) being part paymnt for one hundred to one hundred
fifty thousand fem of oak lumber to be delivered at Laflin, Mo., by Jan. 1,
1920, * $30-00 per thousand for 8 foot, and $35.00 per thousand for standard
lengths. Same to grade No. 2 common and better and to be inspected at
Laflin." (Sgd) "Chas. E. Presnell". Defendant in his answer set up fraud
upon the part of plaintiff's agent in representing that lumber to "grade No. 2
coimon and better" meant the same as "mill run," whereas it meant a certain
grade of lumber and that therefore, he could not deliver under this contract
the entire output of his mill Subsequently defendant and plaintiff's agent
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orally modified the contract by mutual consent so that defendant could only
be required to deliver such quantity as he might be reasonably able to cut and
deliver. Defendant alleges that he complied with the contract as modified but
that the plaintiff refused to inspect and to accept the lumber. Shortly following,
defendants sold the lumber to another party and gave notice to plaintiff that he
would not furnish him any more. Ai a result of this. plainmiff brought action for
breach of contract as stated above. Two of the principal points stated by
defendant a grounds for ippeal were (1) Failure of the lower court to sus-
tain a demurrer to plaintiff's testimony because the contract was void for un-
certainty as to the kinds and quantity of lumber contracted for, and (2)
That defendant's testimony as to modification of contract was not denied.
With reference to point Number I. the only thing not definitely provided
in the contract was the amount of P-foot lengths and the amount of standard
lengths that were to be furnished. The Supreme Court held that a contract
such as this gave the defendant the right to select the amount of each kind of
the different lengths he would furnish, and with that right resting in him he
had At in his power to comply with the terms of the contract so far as that
provision Aas concerned and that th: contract was a valid and binding contract.
Evidently the rule of construction id ceium est quod cerium reddi potest was ap-
plied. This view is supported in The American Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Dent, 151
Mo. App. 614, in which the contract was for furnishfs lumber to be sawed
from standing trees. There was a suit for damages for breach of contract.
The defense was made that the cordract was so indefinite it could not be com-
plied with since there was nothing to show the quantity of each variety to be
shipped. The Court held, however, that since the mininmum amount of lumber
to be furnished was stzed the defendant might select the amount and variety
of each kind to be shipped, and that the contract could have been complied
which had the defendant so desired. Consdering point Number 2, the Court held
that s-nce this contract wis for the purchase of personal property of greater
value than $30. to be binding it must be in writing under the
Statute of Frauds. The statute was complied with in this respect with reference
to the original contract. But the rule is also well settled in Missouri that a
contract required to be in writing can only be changed or modified in writing.
Rucker v. Harrington. 52 Mo. App. 481; Arky v. Commission Co., 185 Mo.
App. 281; Warren v. Mayer Mfg. Co. 161 Mo. 112. Since the modified con-
tract in the main case uder consideration was not in writing it could not be
held binding. In the case of Ark v. Brockman Co.. 185 Mo. App. 241, the
plaintiff declared not alone on a written contract, evidenced by a memorandum,
hut upon this as modified by, or taken together with a subsequent oral agree-
ment. "he Court held that, while a contract not required to be in writing by
the Statute of Frauds may be subsequently modified or varied by an oral agree-
,nent, a contract required to be in writing under the Statute cannot be modi-
fied or varied by a subsequent oral agreement.
As above shown the contract in the case of Fuller v. Presnell, 233 S. W.
502, was held not to be void for uncertainty and the modified contract set forth
by the defendant was held not binding. Therefore the judgment of the lower
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cmrt for plaimW was affirred, provided the plaintiff remit within ten days .dl
of the judgment in excess of $1215, said remittance being based upon a point
rit considered i this dAiscmsi.
CORPORATIOI4S-UABILITY FOR SLANDER.
In the recent case of Allen v. Edward Light Co., 223 S. W. 953 (Mo,
App.), the pla*ntff sued the defendant corporation of which he was an em-
Phl7ee for slander, smoa by the pre ide-t of the corporation in the bearing
of another eloyee. Plain" wis a salesman, with authority to make small
dcoatins to customers, and i the ccerche of this authority he gave a pur-
chases goods valued at $1.10. Lefkovits. the president of the corporation, hear-
ing of this donation had detectives i stigate and discovered that the goods
had actually been given 4o the cstomer. The plahiff was called to the pres-
*kent's office, where be was faced by Lefkovits and two detectives, Milton and
Va.eatj Lefkoits and Milton both accused the plaintiff of being a thief, of
having stole the goods and intited that they had papers to prove their state-
men. The defendant coporation insisted that the words, beft spoken to the
plaintiff and not of hbn, were not slanderous; that inasmuch as only Valleau.
an employee had heard the accusation there was no publiion; and further
that the corporation and Lefleovits, stading ta the relation of principal and
agent, were severally liable for their slanders and coald not be jointly sued.
Disposing of these defenses in their order the Court held that it was no
defense to an action for slander that the words were spoken to and not of the
plamdtf; that there was sufficient publication when Vallean heard the accusa-
tions made by Lefkovits and Milton, and the frct that he was an employee of
the corporation was immaterial; finally that the president being the owner of
the corporation was speaking both for himself and the corporation when he
uttered the slander and was jointly liable with the corporation.
ESTATE IN ENTIRETY-SURVIVORSHIP, WHEN APPLICABLE.
In the r I case of McGhee v. Henry, 234 S. W. (Tenn.) 509, a hus-
bund and wife held cerhin tracts of land as tenants by the entirety. The es-
tate in entirety is very shiilar to the joint estate, its important feature being
the right of survivorship. Upon the death of one, the survivor takes the entire
estate to the exclusion of the heirs of the deceased. In the case under discus-
sioan, both husband and wife pershed simultaneously by being burned to death
in a building i Lcansdal, West Virginia. It was held that their being no sur-
vivor, both having did at the same instant, the children and heirs of each in-
herited one-half of the estate. In the absence of statutes to the contrary or any
fact to prove which one survived the other, there is no presumption as to sur-
vivorsbip. United States Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301; Coye v. Leach,
8 Metc. (Mass.) 371; Walton v. Busehel, 121 Tenn. 715. For a full discus-
sion see 8 R. C. 716.
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